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OS REGISTRY
0402-88

1-1-Tel cn

WORKING PAPER

STU-III ISSUES

25X1



25X1

- Who pays for retrofit? Discussions with V1, NSA reveal that vendor will not and NSA doesn't want to, either. That leaves the user agency responsible for bearing the cost of the retrofit. V1 did mention the possibility of NSA sharing the retrofit cost with the user agency.

Solutions -

- Stop production until the modification is available.
  Responsible Agency: NSA.
- Have NSA pay the retrofit costs.
  Responsible Agency: NSA.
- User agencies refuse acceptance until fix is implemented. Follow OSD lead.
  Responsible Agency: Each user agency.

25X1

Discussion: [redacted] STU-IIIs cost between $2300 and $3500 each, depending on the model. If NSA had cooperated with

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25X1

25X1 ACOUSTICAL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY

Acoustical

25X1 Problem - The STU-III is compatible with almost all telephone systems, and as such, can be used just about anywhere. It is also a highly mobile unit and could easily be removed from an office and used in an individual's residence. There are also models available which can be installed in vehicles. These locations are not ordinarily cleared for classified conversation.

25X1 Solution - User agencies must formulate policy to prevent this.

25X1 Responsible Agency - Each user agency.

25X1 Problem - It is likely that the STU-III will be used in government offices which do not have adequate acoustical security. This poses the risk of classified conversations being overheard by uncleared persons outside (or even inside) the area.

25X1 Solution - User agencies must formulate policy which mandates minimum acoustical standards for offices in which the STU-III is to be used.

25X1 Responsible Agency - Each user agency.

25X1



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25X1 [redacted]

25X1 Solution - [redacted] Set minimum standards for physical security of areas in which classified information is to be discussed. (This is already in effect for the SCI world.) These standards could and probably should be different for different levels of classified discussion. An area where collateral TOP SECRET information is discussed routinely would require more stringent physical security measures than an area where SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL information is discussed.

25X1 Responsible Agency - [redacted] Each user agency.

CRADLE TO GRAVE PROTECTION

Production

25X1 [redacted]

Solution

25X1 - [redacted] Clear production workers to at least the SECRET level. This includes the assembly line personnel, and subcontractors who build major components to include computer chips and circuit boards. This appears to be the most practical, least expensive alternative. The US government should also consider improving the physical security of the assembly line to prevent access by uncleared personnel.

25X1 - [redacted] Devise an inspection program for the STU-IIIs as they come off the assembly line to determine whether any unauthorized modifications have occurred.

NOTE: This is not terribly practical due to a lack of configuration control on the STU-III. (I.e. A STU-III built today does not have to look like one

25X1 SECRET [redacted]

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built yesterday. Vendors are not required to notify the government of circuit changes until some time after they have occurred.) This also makes an X-ray program unfeasible. Also, the sheer numbers of STU-IIIs being built would overwhelm already overtaxed US Government technical surveillance countermeasures assets.

25X1 Responsible Agency - [redacted] Primarily NSA.

Maintenance

25X1 Problem - [redacted] There is no requirement for the STU-III to be maintained by cleared personnel.

25X1 Solution - [redacted] Most, if not all, US Government agencies represented on the STU-III Special Handling Working Group see a need for a secure maintenance procedure. All vendors can implement secure procedures at an additional cost. Conversations with V1, NSA revealed that NSA didn't think anyone saw a need for secure maintenance. Each agency needs to inform NSA officially if they want their STU-IIIs maintained by cleared personnel.

25X1 Responsible Agency - [redacted] Each user agency.

COMSEC (Key Ordering Procedures)

25X1 Problem - [redacted] No procedures in effect to track SCI crypto ignition keys.

25X1 Solution - [redacted] Develop policy to insure SCI keys are only used in SCI areas.

25X1 Responsible Agency - [redacted] Facilities Protection Working Group/SCI Forum (action ongoing).

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